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The purpose of this paper is to study whether trade frictions in durable goods 
markets help account for the patterns of household consumption expenditures 
observed in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), namely that the response of 
durable goods expenditures to income shocks is 78 percent larger than that of 
nondurable goods and the variance of the idiosyncratic part of log durable goods 
expenditures is four times as high as that of log nondurable goods expenditures. To 
do so, I develop a model with a continuum of households that purchase durable as 
well as nondurable goods. The key assumption is that durable goods cannot be 
rented or sold after purchase. By comparing stationary distributions of the model 
with and without trade frictions, I find that trade frictions are crucial in accounting 
for the expenditure patterns observed in the data. 
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 1 Introduction
Because perfect risk sharing has been statistically rejected in much of the literature,
economists have been trying to understand the causes of imperfect risk sharing and the
extent to which households can insure their income risk.1 Although this recent work
has produced many insights, most of this work abstracts from all frictions in goods
markets to simplify the analysis. By contrast, I quantitatively examine the eect of
trade frictions in durable goods markets on household consumption smoothing in this
paper.
Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), I document that the
elasticity of `small' durable goods expenditures, which excludes expenditures on ve-
hicles and houses, with respect to idiosyncratic income is 78 percent higher than that
of nondurable goods expenditures.2 Furthermore, the cross-sectional variance of the
idiosyncratic part of log expenditures on small durable goods is four times as high
as that of log nondurable goods expenditures. I show that taking into account trade
frictions in small durable goods markets, modeled as irreversibility constraints, is
crucial in accounting for these patterns of household consumption expenditures.
To examine the empirical relevance of trade frictions in durable goods markets, this
paper compares the stationary distributions of three models to the data. The three
models dier in the degree of trade frictions in nancial and durable goods markets.
The rst model is a variant of the Huggett (1993) model with durable goods. I
assume that households cannot resell their durable goods, or that trade frictions are
large enough to close all secondary markets. I call this model the Incomplete Markets
with Durable Goods (IMD) model. The second model has no friction in secondary
1See, among others, Nelson (1994), Attanasio and Davis (1996), Hayashi et al. (1996), Dynarski
and Gruber (1997), and Gervais and Klein (2006) for tests of perfect risk sharing. Krueger and Perri
(2006) document that consumption inequality increased less than income inequality over the 1980{
2003 period in the U.S. The authors note that a higher income risk endogenously relaxes nancial
constraints households face in the model with limited commitment, which can, at least qualitatively,
account for the empirical evidence. Blundell et al. (2008) argue that changes in the persistence of
income shocks can explain the evolution of consumption inequality. Incorporating changes in the
U.S. wage structure in detail, Heathcote et al. (2008) show that their overlapping-generations model
with exogenous borrowing constraints and endogenous labor supply can replicate the evolution of
the cross-sectional distributions of wages, hours worked, earnings, and consumption.
2Small durable goods include apparel, household furnishings and equipment, medical equipment,
televisions, radios, sound equipment, sporting goods, games, toys, lm and photographic equipment,
and books, which account for about 16% of total expenditure in the CEX.
1durable goods trades, as opposed to the IMD model. Because this model does not
have trade frictions in durable goods markets, it can be rewritten as a model with
rental markets. For this reason, I call this model the Incomplete Markets with Durable
Goods Rental (IMDR) model. The third model diers from the IMDR model in that
it allows durable goods to be used as collateral for borrowing. With the addition of
collateralized borrowing opportunities, the third model features the same equilibrium
consumption allocation as that in a model with exogenous borrowing constraints and
two nondurable goods. I call this model the Standard Incomplete Markets (SIM)
model.
Before examining the quantitative implications of the three models, I study the
qualitative properties of household expenditure allocations in these models. In the
SIM model, regardless of whether or not collateral constraints bind, households keep
the ratio of nondurable and durable goods consumption constant. In the IMDR
model, when households who are currently liquidity constrained receive an adverse
income shock, they reduce their expenditures on durable goods to maintain a con-
stant level of nondurable goods.3 Hence, the response of durable goods expenditures
to income changes tends to be larger in the IMDR model than in the SIM model. In
the IMD model, irreversibility of durable goods expenditures dampens the response
of durable goods expenditures to income changes for the following two reasons. First,
households cannot sell durable goods even if they would like to do so ex post. Second,
when households receive positive income shocks, they do not increase their durable
expenditures as much as they would without the irreversibility constraints, because
they cannot sell durable goods in the future. Therefore, the IMD model tends to fea-
ture less adjustment in durable goods expenditures than the SIM and IMDR models.
The next step is to study whether the trade frictions are quantitatively important
in accounting for the empirical facts described above. To answer this question, I
calibrate the above three models and compare the stationary distributions of the
models to the CEX data. Results show that the models without trade frictions in
durable goods markets (the IMDR and SIM models) generate an elasticity of durable
goods expenditures with respect to income and the variance of log durable goods
expenditures more than 10 times as high as those from the CEX data. Although
3Browning and Crossley (2004) nd empirical evidence for this behavior, using data on food and
clothing expenditures from the Canadian Out of Employment Panel Survey.
2the IMD model still overstates the elasticity of durable goods expenditures, it closely
matches the empirical estimates of the variance of log durable and nondurable goods
expenditures, generating the variance of log durable goods expenditures that is only
9:5% percent higher than the estimate from the CEX data.
I conclude this section by reviewing related articles. Browning and Crossley (2004)
examine the eects of cuts in the unemployment insurance benets on household food,
clothing, and total expenditures using data from the Canadian Out of Employment
Panel Survey. The authors nd that the eect of marginal dollars of benet on cloth-
ing expenditures is twice as large in absolute terms (dollars) as the eect on food
expenditures, despite the fact that the budget share of food expenditures is much
larger than that of clothing expenditures in their sample. Using the data from the
CEX, I also nd that the response of small durable goods expenditures to income
changes is larger than that of nondurable goods expenditures. In contrast to Brown-
ing and Crossley (2004), however, I compare steady states of the models with and
without trade frictions in durable goods markets with the empirical evidence to quan-
titatively examine the implications of trade frictions households face. Luengo-Prado
(2006) examines a model with durable and nondurable goods that nests the IMDR
and SIM models as special cases. The author mainly considers houses and vehicles as
durable goods and thus models collateral constraints, down payment requirements,
and adjustment costs. The author nds that the down payment requirements and
adjustment costs help account for both excess smoothness and excess sensitivity ob-
served in the US aggregate data. Unlike Luengo-Prado (2006), I focus my attention
on small durable goods, excluding houses and vehicles, and examine the empirical
relevance of trade frictions modeled by irreversibility constraints on durable goods
expenditures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical re-
sults. Section 3 describes the environment. Section 4 compares the three models in
terms of the rst order conditions of the households' problem. Section 5 explains the
benchmark parameterization and reports the main ndings. Section 6 concludes. The
equivalence between models with no friction in durable goods markets and models
with rental markets for durable goods is formally established in the Appendix.
32 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I rst describe the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Then I
present empirical evidence from the CEX data on the elasticity of nondurable and
durable goods expenditures with respect to the idiosyncratic part of household in-
come as well as the cross-sectional variance of the logarithm of the two types of
expenditures.
2.1 The Consumer Expenditure Survey
The Consumer Expenditure Survey is a unique survey in the United States that pro-
vides detailed information on both expenditure and income at the household level.
In the survey, each household is interviewed once every three months over ve con-
secutive quarters. In the second through fth interviews, households report their
expenditures for the last three months to the time of each interview. Income infor-
mation is collected in the second and fth interviews and refers to the last 12 months
from the time of the interview.
I use the CEX data for 1980 to 2001. My sample consists of households whose
head is at least 21 years of age but no older than 65. To ensure data quality for
income and expenditure, I reject observations if a household has been classied as an
incomplete income reporter, has missed interviews, has not reported characteristics
necessary for my analysis, such as gender, race, and education, or reported incon-
sistent characteristics across interviews, has reported zero food expenditure or only
food expenditures, has reported non-positive earnings or income, has reported house-
hold head's wage less than half the minimum wage, or has reported negative medical
expenditures. Table 10 in the Appendix reports the step-by-step sample selection.
2.1.1 Expenditure Variables
The category of nondurable goods includes food at home, food away from home, al-
coholic beverages, household operations, rental of house furnishings, utilities, apparel
services, rental of educational books, fees and admissions, vehicle-related expenses
such as rental, licenses, insurance, and gasoline and motor oil, public transportation,
4medical services, prescription drugs, personal care products and services, newspapers
and magazines, and tobacco and smoking supplies. Expenditures in this category ac-
count for about 50% of total expenditures. The category of durable goods includes ap-
parel, household furnishings and equipment, medical equipments, televisions, radios,
sound equipment, sporting goods, games, toys, lm and photographic equipment, and
books, which account for about 16% of total expenditures in the CEX data. I de
ate
expenditure data by detailed CPI data with the base years of 1982{1984 and by an
adult equivalence scale taken to be the square root of family size.
Housing expenses, such as mortgage interest payments and property taxes and
expenses of vehicle purchases are not included in the above categories because houses
and vehicles are very dierent from the durable goods listed above, especially in
lumpiness and development of secondary markets. Because the computational burden
would become overwhelming if these goods were additionally incorporated, I focus my
attention on consumption smoothing with regards to other goods in this paper. To
treat home owners and renters symmetrically, the rent paid by renters is also excluded
from nondurable goods. Tuition, health insurance, and life insurance are not included
because they are not expenditures for consumption.
2.1.2 Income Variable
My income measure is after-tax income plus transfers. This income concept is dened
as the sum of labor earnings and transfers, minus total taxes paid, social security con-
tributions, and retirement contributions. Labor earnings consist of wages and salaries
and a fraction (0.864) of self-employment income.4 Transfers consist of private and
public transfers, such as alimony payments received, social security benets, unem-
ployment compensation, public assistance, and welfare payments. I de
ate income
data by the CPI for all items for the relevant 12 months and by the square root of
the family size.
4The fraction of self-employment income that is considered labor income is taken from D az-
Gim enez et al. (1997).
52.2 Empirical Results
To characterize how idiosyncratic variation in income translates into idiosyncratic
variation in nondurable and durable goods expenditures at the household level, I
present two statistics using the CEX data. The rst statistic is the income elasticity
of both types of expenditures. The second is the variance of logarithms. To extract
the idiosyncratic component of the expenditure and income variables, I rst regress
the logarithm of a given variable on a constant, the quadratic of the household head's
age, household size, the number of earners in the household, dummy variables for
region of residence, household head's gender, and household head's and spouse's (if
present) race, education, and occupation. Let ci;t, xi;t and yi;t denote nondurable
goods expenditures, durable goods expenditures, and income of household i in period




























where zi;t represents a vector of the observable characteristics of household i in pe-




i;t are residuals. I take the residuals as a measure of the
idiosyncratic component of the given variable.
To compute the elasticity of nondurable and durable expenditures with respect to













where 4 is a dierence operator: for example, 4uc
i;t = uc
i;t  uc
i;t 1. For this exercise,
given the survey structure of the CEX described above, I use annual income data
collected at the second and fth interview which overlap for three months. As for
expenditure, I use quarterly expenditure data collected at the second and fth inter-
views. Regression coecients c and x represent the income elasticity of nondurable
and durable goods expenditures, respectively.
5I run the cross-sectional regressions separately year by year, allowing the coecients to vary
over time.
6Table 1 presents the estimation results. The estimate of c is 0:0711, while that
of x is 0:1268. Note that x is 78% higher than c. The OLS estimates of c and
x are, however, likely to be biased toward zero because income growth is likely to be
measured with error.6 To address this issue, I include (classical) measurement error
in the simulation analysis presented in Section 5.2 to evaluate the model's ability to
replicate the empirical evidence. Note that c is signicantly greater than zero even
with the possible downward bias, which strongly suggests that households are not
fully insured against idiosyncratic income risk.
The last three columns in Table 1 report the cross-sectional variance of the idiosyn-
cratic component of log income, nondurable and durable goods expenditures. For this
exercise, I use income data reported in the fth interview and annual nondurable and
durable goods expenditures, summing up quarterly expenditures reported in the sec-
ond through fth interviews. Note that the annual expenditure data refer to exactly
the same period as the income reported in the fth interview for each observation.
First, one notices that the variance of the idiosyncratic part of log nondurable goods
expenditures is about half the variance of the idiosyncratic part of log income. Sec-
ond, the variance of the idiosyncratic part of log durable goods expenditures is four
times as high as that of log nondurable goods expenditures. Furthermore note that
the variance of log durable goods expenditures is twice as high as that of log income.
3 The Model
3.1 The Environment
There is a continuum of households with identical preferences. There are two types
of goods, one is nondurable and the other is durable. Let xt denote expenditures on
6In the literature, several studies address the issue of measurement error in estimating the re-
sponse of consumption to income changes using the CEX data. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) use
an instrumental variable (IV) approach with an alternative income variable available in the CEX as
an instrument. Gervais and Klein (2006) note that measurement error arises in the CEX, because
two income reports overlap for three months due to the survey design. The authors argue that the
instrumental variable used in Dynarski and Gruber (1997) is invalid for this type of measurement
error and the IV estimator tends to overstate the consumption response. The authors propose a
projection-based estimation and show that their estimate lies between the OLS and IV estimates.
7Table 1: Patterns of Nondurable and Durable Goods Expenditures





0.0711 0.1268 0.2558 0.1286 0.5190
(0.0046) (0.0117) (0.0047) (0.0017) (0.0090)
Notes. Columns labelled c and x report the OLS estimates of the elasticity of nondurable and
durable goods expenditures with respect to income. V ar(u
y
i;t), V ar(uc
i;t), and V ar(ux
i;t) are the
average of the cross-sectional variance of the idiosyncratic component of the given variable over
the 1980{2001 period. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors of the variances are
computed by bootstrap with 100 repetitions. (Source: CEX)
durable goods in period t and kt the stock of durable goods in the beginning of period t.
Households make durable goods expenditures in the beginning of each period. Then,
the stock of durable goods evolves as follows: kt+1 = (1   )(kt + xt), where  is
the depreciation rate. Let dt denote the consumption services of durable goods in
period t. The consumption services of durable goods in period t are measured by the
sum of stocks plus expenditures: that is, dt = kt + xt. Let ct denote expenditures
on nondurable goods in period t. The consumption services of nondurable goods
are simply measured by ct. Households obtain utility from ct and dt. Household









where  is the discount factor and E0 is the expectation operator conditional on


















where  is the degree of relative risk aversion,  is the elasticity of substitution be-
tween nondurable and durable goods and  governs the ratio of nondurable goods
to consumption services of durable goods. Each household faces a stochastic endow-
ment process fytgt. The endowment process is a stationary Markov chain with nite
support Y , transition probabilities (y0jy), and unique invariant measure .
83.2 Market Structures
This section describes the market structure of the three models whose quantitative
properties I study in the following section. In all three models, the only nancial
assets that households can trade are risk-free bonds denoted at. Let r denote the
interest rate of the risk-free bond.
In the rst model, households cannot sell their durable goods. That is, xt  0.
In addition, households face borrowing constraints of the form at+1   a, where a is
exogenously given. The household problem, in recursive form, is as follows:











c + x + a
0  y + (1 + r)a; (2)
a
0   a; (3)
x  0; (4)
c  0; (5)
d = k + x  0; (6)
where variables with a prime denote the value of the corresponding variable in the
next period and s = (y;a;k). This is the IMD model.
The second model diers from the IMD model in that this model has no frictions
in durable goods markets. Households can buy and sell durable goods without any
additional restrictions. Thus, in this model, households do not face constraint (4).
The household problem is otherwise identical to the above. This is the IMDR model.
The reason for this name is that this model can be represented by a model with rental
markets for durable goods, as shown in the Appendix.
The third model has a dierent nancial market structure from the above. In
addition to non-collateralized borrowing with the limit a, households are now allowed
to borrow using durable goods as collateral. Thus, instead of the constraint (3),
households face the following constraint:
a




9Households can buy and sell durable goods with no trade frictions as in the IMDR
model. As shown in the Appendix, the household problem in this model can be
rewritten as that of two nondurable goods (c and d) and exogenous borrowing con-
straints of the form in (3) in terms of net wealth dened by a + k=(1 + r).7 Because
this model may be a choice if one abstracts from trade frictions in durable goods
markets, it is of interest to compare this model with the other two models, although
collateralized borrowing may be unlikely given the type of durable goods considered
in this paper.8 Because the third model can be represented by a model with two non-
durable goods and simple exogenous borrowing constraints, I call it the SIM model.
Table 2 summarizes the dierences of the three market structures considered in this
paper.
To study expenditure allocations of nondurable and small durable goods in tractable
settings, I abstract from many markets, in particular (frictional) markets for houses
and vehicles. Therefore, I consider an open-economy version of the above models with
the risk-free interest rate exogenously xed and compare the stationary distribution
of the models with the CEX data in terms of the statistics presented in Section 2.2.
Table 2: Three Market Structures




Notes. The check mark X means that the corresponding model has the constraint, while  means
that the corresponding model does not have the constraint.
4 Qualitative Analysis
In this section, I qualitatively examine the eects of borrowing and irreversibility
constraints on optimal expenditure allocations over nondurable and durable goods.
7Luengo-Prado (2006) also notes this reformulation of the household problem with the change of
variables.
8Note that households can borrow money from pawnshops in exchange for small durable goods
such as jewelry.
10I start with the SIM model where households do not face irreversibility constraints
in durable goods markets but face collateral constraints (7) in nancial markets. Let









 = (r+)=(1+r), which is typically referred to as the user cost of the durable
good in the literature. Under the utility function specied in Section 3.1, this becomes
c=d = 
(=(1   )). It is important to note that this equation holds regardless of
whether or not the borrowing constraint binds.
In the SIM model, households can borrow up to the present value of the stock of
durable goods, kt+1=(1+r), plus the exogenously determined borrowing constraint, a.
The presence of collateral borrowing opportunities allows households to separate the
intertemporal allocation of resources and the intratemporal allocation of consumption
services over nondurable and durable goods. When the collateral constraint binds,
therefore, households adjust consumption of nondurable and durable goods propor-
tionately, keeping the ratio of nondurable and durable goods consumption constant.
Next, consider the IMDR model, which corresponds to the above SIM model
except that households can no longer use durable goods as collateral. The optimal













where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint. Un-
like the SIM model, the borrowing constraints aect intratemporal allocations over
c and d. When the borrowing constraint binds, c=d > 
(=(1   )). In the current
environment, households face a binding borrowing constraint when their income is
suciently low, given their asset holdings. Thus, the rst order condition implies that
when households receive adverse income shocks and cannot borrow any more, house-
holds cut back their expenditures on durable goods more than those on nondurable
goods or even sell their durable goods to smooth nondurable consumption over time.
Since this type of behavior is absent in the SIM model, the IMDR model tends to
feature a larger response of durable goods expenditures to income changes than the
SIM model.
11Lastly, consider the IMD model where households face irreversibility constraints on
durable goods expenditures in addition to borrowing constraints in nancial markets.



















where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the irreversibility constraints. In
addition to the borrowing constraints, the irreversibility constraints aect the optimal
intratemporal allocation rule. First note that the coecient on t, the Lagrange mul-
tiplier associated with the irreversibility constraint in the current period, is negative.
It is not surprising because households cannot sell their durable goods and conse-
quently hold a relatively high level of durable goods stock when they receive large
adverse income shocks, compared with the case without the irreversibility constraints.
On the other hand, if the irreversibility constraints bind in some state tomorrow
and no other constraints bind, it holds that c=d > 
(=(1 )). Because neither the
borrowing nor irreversibility constraints bind in the current period, households tend
to have high income. Then the rst order condition means that in the presence of
irreversibility constraints, households do not increase durable goods expenditures as
much as they would do without the irreversibility constraints.
The above analysis shows that the irreversibility constraints aect optimal expen-
diture allocations over nondurable and durable goods in two dierent ways. First,
there is a direct eect: namely, that households cannot sell durable goods even if
they want to do so. Second, there is also an indirect (precautionary) eect. When
households receive positive income shocks, households do not increase durable expen-
ditures as much as they would without the irreversibility constraints because they
cannot sell durable goods in the future. To summarize, the IMD model features less
adjustment in durable goods expenditures than the SIM and IMDR models.
125 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I quantitatively examine whether the irreversibility constraints (trade
frictions in durable goods markets) can help account for the empirical evidence on the
patterns of nondurable and durable goods expenditures presented in Table 1. To do so,
I rst set parameter values in the IMD, IMDR, and SIM models so that the stationary
distribution of each model captures some important aspects of the US economy over
the 1980{2001 period. Second, I estimate the elasticity of nondurable and durable
goods expenditures with respect to income and the variance of log nondurable and
durable goods expenditures using simulated data.9 Then I compare estimates from
the simulated data with those from the CEX data.
5.1 Benchmark Parameterization
The model period is set to one year. I set all the parameter values except for the value
of the discount factor  externally based on empirical evidence or the literature. Then
for each model, I calibrate  so that the stationary distribution of the given model
features a target ratio of average wealth to average income. As noted in Storesletten
et al. (2004a), it is important that households have a realistic amount of wealth in the
stationary distribution because it determines the amount of self-insurance, in addition
to the adjustment of durable goods expenditures. For the benchmark, I choose the
value of 2.6 for the wealth (including nancial wealth and housing wealth) to income
ratio, computed by Krueger and Perri (2006) using the CEX data for 1980{1981. In
the rest of this section, I explain the benchmark values of the other parameters.
5.1.1 Preference and Technology
I set the degree of relative risk aversion  to 2 and the elasticity of substitution
between nondurable and durable goods  to 1.10 I set the risk-free rate, r, to 4
9I simulate a sample of 5000 agents for 300 periods starting from a degenerate distribution. To
insulate the results from the eect of the initial conditions, I use the simulated data for the last 50
periods to compute the statistics. Then I repeat the simulation ve times and report the averages
of the given statistics over the ve repetitions.
10There is no conclusive evidence on  in the literature. See Fern andez-Villaverde and Krueger
(2002) for a discussion on this issue.
13percent, which is the after-tax real return on physical capital found in McGrattan
and Prescott (2003). The exogenous borrowing limit, a, is set equal to 1, which
corresponds to the average annual income.
I select the depreciation rate  based on data from Fixed Reproducible Tangible
Wealth in the United States, 1925{1994, Bils and Klenow (1998) and the CEX. More
precisely, I compute  by by dividing a constant, called a declining balance rate, by the
weighted average of the expected life of component durable goods with expenditure
shares as weights. I set the declining balance rate to 1:65, the value used by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for consumer durables that roughly correspond to the
small durable goods considered in this paper. Table 11 shows the expected life and
expenditure shares of durable goods. Data on the expected life of each durable good
are from Table 2 of Bils and Klenow (1998) and Table C of Fixed Reproducible Tangible
Wealth in the United States, 1925-1994. Data on expenditure share of each durable
good are from the CEX. This exercise sets  = 0:1839.
For the benchmark calibration, I choose the share parameter  using the un-
constrained intratemporal expenditure allocation rule over nondurable and durable
goods. The rst order condition is given by:















(E[k] + E[x]): (8)
Meanwhile, the law of motion of stocks of durable goods and stationarity imply that



















where F1 = (1=)((r + )=(1 + r)) and F2 = E[c]=E[x]. I use the sample average
of de
ated expenditures on nondurable and durable goods in the CEX as a proxy
for E[c] and E[x]. Given the benchmark values of r, , and , the formula yields
 = 0:7205.
14Table 3: Benchmark Parameter Values (Preference and Technology)
 Degree of relative risk aversion 2
 Substitution elasticity between nondurable and durable 1
r Risk free rate 0:04
 Depreciation rate 0:1839
 Weight on nondurable goods 0:7205
5.1.2 Income Process
I model the idiosyncratic part of the logarithm of household income as follows:
lnyit = zit + "it + it; with "it  N(0;
2
"); and it  N(0;
2
);
zit = zit 1 + it; with it  N(0;
2
);
where lnyit represents the idiosyncratic part of the logarithm of the observed in-
come of household i at t, zit represents the persistent component of the observed
idiosyncratic income, "it represents the transitory component, it represents (classi-
cal) measurement error, and it represents an innovation to the persistent component.
It is important to include the measurement error component, because income data in
the CEX are likely to contain measurement error that biases the estimate of income
risk as well as the expenditure elasticity with respect to income. I assume that "it,
it, and it are i.i.d., independent of each other, and serially uncorrelated.
I set autocorrelation  to 0.95, which is an intermediate value of the point estimates
presented in Storesletten et al. (2004b).11 I select the variance of the measurement
error 2
, using validation studies on annual earnings for the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Bound and Krueger
(1994) document that measurement error explains 28 percent of the overall variance
of the rate of growth of earnings in the CPS, while Bound et al. (1994) document that
the corresponding value for the PSID data is 22 percent. Hence I set the benchmark
level to an intermediate value of 25 percent, which implies 2
 = 0:0259 for my CEX
sample.12 Given the values of  and 2
, I estimate 2
" and 2
z by solving the following
11Storesletten et al. (2004b) estimate an earnings process with persistent and transitory compo-
nents using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics for 1968-1993.
12Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) use the same value, 25 percent, for their estimation of an earnings











where Cov(lnyit;lnyit 1) and V ar(lnyit) are the average of Cov(lnyit;lnyit 1) and




For the numerical analysis, I discretize the stochastic process described above. The
transitory and measurement error components take two values with equal probability,
with "it 2 f ";"g and it 2 f ;g. I discretize the AR(1) process for the
persistent component to a seven-state Markov chain by the Tauchen and Hussey
(1991) procedure, matching the empirical estimate of 2
z.
Table 4: Benchmark Parameter Values (Income Process)
 Autocorrelation 0:95
2
z Variance of persistent component 0:1733
2
 Variance of transitory component 0:0565
2
 Variance of measurement error 0:0259
5.2 Quantitative Results
Table 5 reports the benchmark result.13 The top panel contains estimates of the ex-
penditure/consumption elasticity with respect to idiosyncratic income from the CEX
data and those from the stationary distributions of the three models considered in
this paper. With the benchmark parameter values, all three models slightly under-
states the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditures (c) and largely overstates that
of durable goods expenditures (x) relative to the empirical evidence from the CEX
process with measurement error using the PSID data, referring to the same validation studies.
However, the survey design of the CEX described in Section 2.1 may add some noise to the variance
of income growth that is not present in other surveys. To partially address this issue, I conduct
sensitivity analysis with alternative levels of the variance of the measurement error in Section 5.3.4.
13Since the CEX does not provide information on sales, I set durable goods expenditure xit to zero
if it takes on a negative value in simulated data to make the CEX and simulated data comparable.
16Table 5: Comparison of Models and Data
c x 4xc d
CEX 0.0711 0.1268 0.0557 n.a.
IMD 0.0624 0.6196 0.5572 0.0718
IMDR 0.0613 1.7219 1.6606 0.0784
SIM 0.0658 1.3281 1.2623 0.0660
V ar(lncit) V ar(lnxit) 4V arxc 
CEX 0.1286 0.5190 0.3904 n.a.
IMD 0.1283 0.5683 0.4400 0.9444
IMDR 0.1280 8.1109 7.9829 0.9445
SIM 0.1375 6.6394 6.5019 0.9456
Notes. c, x, and d represent the OLS estimate of the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditure
with respect to income, that of durable goods expenditure, and that of durable goods consumption,
respectively. The regression equation is described in Section 2.2. 4xc = x   c. 4V arxc =
V ar(lnxit)   V ar(lncit). For the CEX, columns V ar(lncit) and V ar(lnxit) report V ar(uc
it) and
V ar(ux
it), respectively. The discount factor  is calibrated to the wealth{income ratio of 2:6, given
the other parameter values.
data. The elasticity of nondurable goods expenditures in the IMD model is 0.0624,
whiich is 12 percent lower than the estimate from the CEX data. On the other hand,
the elasticity of durable goods expenditures is estimated as 0.6196 in the IMD model,
about ve times higher than the empirical counterpart. Consequently, the dierence
between the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditures and that of durable goods
expenditures is 10 times as high in the IMD model as that in the CEX data. How-
ever, compared with the IMDR and SIM models, one notices that the irreversibility
constraints on durable goods expenditures in the IMD model substantially reduce the
responsiveness of durable goods expenditures, bringing the model closer to the empir-
ical evidence. The IMDR model generates an elasticity of durable goods expenditures
with respect to idiosyncratic income 2.8 times higher than that in the IMD model
and 13.6 times higher than the estimate from the CEX data. Note that, conrming
the observation in the qualitative analysis, the IMDR model features higher x than
the SIM model, because of the binding borrowing constraints.
With a larger adjustment of durable goods expenditures to income changes in the
IMDR model, nondurable goods expenditure is slightly less responsive to income in
17the IMDR model than in the IMD model, while the consumption of durable goods
is more responsive to income in the IMDR model than in the IMD model. The SIM
model generates an elasticity of nondurable goods of 0.0658, which is slightly higher
than those in the IMD and IMDR models.
The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the cross-sectional variance of nondurable
and durable goods expenditures, V ar(lncit) and V ar(lnxit), as well as the calibrated
value of the discount factor . In terms of cross-sectional variance, the IMD model
matches the empirical evidence quite well, generating V ar(lnxit)   V ar(lncit), only
12.7 percent higher than the CEX data. This observation seems inconsistent with the
large response of durable goods expenditures to income changes in the IMD model
relative to the CEX data. It may suggest that either x is substantially more biased
downward than c because of the use of quarterly expenditures instead of annual
expenditures in the estimation using the CEX data14, or the data on annual durable
goods expenditures contain larger measurement errors than annual nondurable goods
expenditures. However, the IMDR and SIM models still largely overstate the variance
of durable goods expenditures relative to the empirical evidence, indicating that the
irreversibility constraints are quantitatively important. The calibrated subjective
discount factor is around 0.1 percent higher in the SIM model than in the IMD and
IMDR models because of the additional collateral borrowing opportunities available
to households in the SIM model.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
To better understand the quantitative results, I conduct sensitivity analyses with
respect to the elasticity of substitution between nondurable and durable goods , the
rate of depreciation of durable goods , the exogenous borrowing limit a, and the
variance of measurement error 2
. In each case, I recalibrate the subjective discount
factor  to the wealth to income ratio of 2.6.
14Because I use quarterly expenditures to measure the growth of annual expenditures in the CEX
data, the OLS estimates of the expenditure elasticity with respect to income are likely to be biased.
In particular, it is likely that my measure does not capture the growth of annual durable goods
expenditures as well as that of annual nondurable goods expenditures because purchases of durable
goods tend to occur infrequently. It may result in a larger downward bias in the OLS estimate of
the elasticity of durable goods expenditures with respect to income than that of nondurable goods
expenditures.
18Table 6: Change in Substitution Elasticity: 
 = 0:5  = 1:5
Model c x d  c x d 
IMD 0.0639 0.5682 0.0683 0.9443 0.0618 0.6417 0.0733 0.9445
IMDR 0.0634 1.3245 0.0723 0.9444 0.0601 1.9326 0.0821 0.9446
SIM 0.0657 1.2947 0.0658 0.9455 0.0657 1.3037 0.0659 0.9455
Notes. c, x, and d represent the OLS estimate of the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditure
with respect to income, that of durable goods expenditure, and that of durable goods consumption,
respectively. The regression equation is described in Section 2.2. The discount factor  is calibrated
to the wealth{income ratio of 2:6.
5.3.1 Alternative Elasticity of Substitution
With the utility function specied as (1), nondurable and durable goods become
complements when  is less than one, while they become substitutes when  is greater
than one.15 Table 6 presents the expenditure/consumption elasticity with respect
to idiosyncratic income (c, x, and d) and the calibrated value of the subjective
discount factor  for  = 0:5 and  = 1:5. In addition to the discount factor,
I also recalibrate  according to the benchmark calibration rule for this exercise.
When  = 0:5, the elasticity of durable goods expenditure with respect to income
(x) decreases in all the models, compared with the benchmark levels. However,
note that x is still much larger than the empirical counterpart. As a result of the
smaller adjustment of durable goods expenditures, the expenditures on nondurable
goods become more responsive to income changes, while the consumption of durable
goods become less responsive. It is intuitive, because households like to smooth out
the ratio of nondurable and durable goods consumption more as these two goods
become complements. The opposite is true when nondurable and durable goods are
substitutes. Therefore, when  = 1:5, households adjust durable goods to income
changes to a larger extent, compared with the benchmark case.
19Table 7: Change in Depreciation Rate: 
 = 0:1  = 0:3
Model c x d  c x d 
IMD 0.0589 0.8037 0.0498 0.9468 0.0673 0.3590 0.0784 0.9430
IMDR 0.0512 4.4803 0.0629 0.9469 0.0658 0.4154 0.0787 0.9428
SIM 0.0561 3.4866 0.0561 0.9485 0.0686 0.3653 0.0692 0.9435
Notes. c, x, and d represent the OLS estimate of the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditure
with respect to income, that of durable goods expenditure, and that of durable goods consumption,
respectively. The regression equation is described in Section 2.2. The discount factor  is calibrated
to the wealth{income ratio of 2:6.
5.3.2 Alternative Depreciation Rate
To examine the role of adjustment of durable goods expenditures for household con-
sumption smoothing, it is helpful to estimate the expenditure/consumption elasticities
with respect to income with alternative depreciation rates of durable goods. If the
depreciation rate is low, households can cut back their expenditures on durable goods
to a larger extent when they receive adverse income shocks, because the consumption
services of durable goods last longer. Table 7 reports the expenditure/consumption
elasticity with respect to income for  = 0:1 and  = 0:3. Note that, as in the
sensitivity analysis with the substitution elasticity, I recalibrate  according to the
benchmark calibration rule, as I change the depreciation rate.
The quantitative eects of the change in depreciation rates on expenditure allo-
cations are substantial. When  = 0:1, which is lower than the benchmark level of
0.1839, the household's precautionary saving motive decreases, and thus the discount
factor is calibrated to be 0.25 to 0.3 percent higher than the benchmark level. In
the IMD model, the response of durable goods expenditures to income changes in-
creases by 29.7 percent, while it increased by around 160 percent in the IMDR and
SIM models. As a result of the larger adjustment of durable goods expenditures, the
response of nondurable goods expenditures to income changes (c) becomes 5 percent
lower than the benchmark level in the IMD model. In the IMDR and SIM models,
the reduction of the response is larger, around 15 percent, because households do not
face trade frictions in durable goods markets in these models.
15The utility function becomes Leontief as  ! 0, and it becomes linear as  ! 1.
20Table 8: Change in Borrowing Limit: a
a = 0:2 a = 2:0
Model c x d  c x d 
IMD 0.0679 0.6866 0.0784 0.9417 0.0592 0.5487 0.0646 0.9467
IMDR 0.0618 1.7990 0.0827 0.9418 0.0550 1.3902 0.0669 0.9466
SIM 0.0700 1.4774 0.0698 0.9432 0.0592 1.1046 0.0590 0.9473
Notes. c, x, and d represent the OLS estimate of the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditure
with respect to income, that of durable goods expenditure, and that of durable goods consumption,
respectively. The regression equation is described in Section 2.2. The discount factor  is calibrated
to the wealth{income ratio of 2:6.
When  = 0:3, c and d increases, x decreases, and  decreases below the
benchmark. Quantitatively, one notices that the dierence between the IMD and
IMDR models (that is, the dierence between the case with and without irreversibility
constraints on durable goods expenditures) falls substantially, with x in the IMDR
model only 15.7 percent higher than that in the IMD model.
5.3.3 Alternative Borrowing Limit
Table 8 reports results with alternative borrowing limits. Calibrating the exogenous
borrowing limit to the proportion of agents with negative or zero wealth, Heathcote
et al. (2008) nd that the borrowing limit is 20 percent of mean annual individual
after-tax earnings in their model, which corresponds to a = 0:2. For an upper bound,
I examine the case with a = 2. With the tighter borrowing limit of a = 0:2, the
responses of nondurable and durable goods consumption to income changes (c and
d) increase. Furthermore, the response of durable goods expenditure to income
changes (x) increases in this case. Note that c in the IMD model is 9.9 percent
higher than that in the IMDR model in this case, which is larger than the benchmark
value of 1.8 percent. This observation indicates that trade frictions in durable goods
markets matter more for household consumption smoothing when households face
tighter constraints in nancial markets. Because a household's precautionary saving
motive is high in this case, the calibrated discount factor is about 0.3 percent lower
than the benchmark level in each model.
When a = 2, as expected, c, x, and d are all lower than the benchmark
21Table 9: Change in Variance of Measurement Error: 2




 = 0  = 0:5
Model c x d  c x d 
IMD 0.1062 0.9698 0.1135 0.9438 0.0574 0.5392 0.0638 0.9447
IMDR 0.0965 2.2610 0.1193 0.9441 0.0547 1.3880 0.0673 0.9447
SIM 0.1034 1.8447 0.1042 0.9451 0.0591 1.1746 0.0594 0.9457
Notes. c, x, and d represent the OLS estimate of the elasticity of nondurable goods expenditure
with respect to income, that of durable goods expenditure, and that of durable goods consumption,
respectively. The regression equation is described in Section 2.2. The discount factor  is calibrated
to the wealth{income ratio of 2:6.
values, while  is higher. Note that with large borrowing opportunities in nancial
markets, the quantitative impact of the irreversibility constraints on durable goods
expenditures is smaller than that in the benchmark.
5.3.4 Alternative Variance of Measurement Error
In this section, I report the results for alternative levels of the variance of measurement
error. For this exercise, I keep the total variance of the transitory component of
the observed idiosyncratic income, 2
 + 2
, constant and change the fraction of the









 is 0.3143 in the benchmark. Table 9 reports results with  = 0 (no measurement
error) and  = 0:5. First note that households face lower overall income risk when
 is high, which results in a higher discount factor  for  = 0:5 compared with the
case with  = 0. Expenditure/consumption responses to income changes (c, x, and
d) fall by half when  changes from 0 to 0:5, because of the downward bias caused
by the measurement error. However, one can conrm that the benchmark results in
terms of a comparison between the IMD, IMDR, and SIM models are robust to the
variation in the variance of measurement error considered in this section.
226 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined whether trade frictions in small durable goods markets,
excluding houses and vehicles, help account for the patterns of household consumption
expenditures observed in the CEX. As trade frictions, I considered an extreme case
in which households cannot sell durable goods after purchase (or, expenditures on
durable goods are irreversible). Empirical evidence from the CEX data shows that
the elasticity of durable goods expenditures with respect to idiosyncratic income is 78
percent higher than that of nondurable goods expenditures, and the cross-sectional
variance of the idiosyncratic part of log durable goods expenditures is four times as
high as that of log nondurable goods expenditures. Both results are consistent with
households adjusting durable goods expenditures to insulate their consumption of
nondurable goods from idiosyncratic income risk.
Calibrating the stationary distributions of the models with and without trade
frictions in durable goods markets, I found that irreversibility constraints on durable
goods expenditures are quantitatively important accounting for the empirical evi-
dence. The comparison between the case with and without the trade frictions in
durable goods markets is robust to small variations in key model parameters including
the elasticity of substitution between nondurable and durable goods, the borrowing
limit, the depreciation rate of durable goods, and the variance of measurement error
in idiosyncratic income, with relatively higher sensitivity with respect to the depreci-
ation rate. The sensitivity analysis also showed that households adjust durable good
purchases to income shocks to a larger extent when borrowing constraints become
tighter or the consumption services of durable goods last longer. Hence the irre-
versibility constraints on durable goods expenditures have a larger eect on household
consumption smoothing in those cases.
Finally, I discuss the limitations of this paper. First, no direct evidence on sec-
ondary transactions of small durable goods has been presented in this paper. It would
be interesting to look into availability of data on this issue. Second, it is also a limi-
tation of this paper that no other possible explanations such as adjustment costs are
examined. To address these limitations, more research is required.
23Appendix
Rental Markets for Durable Goods
This appendix formally establishes that a model with no frictions in durable goods
trades (IMDR and SIM models) can be represented by a model with rental markets
for durable goods. In particular, it is shown that the SIM model corresponds to the
rental markets model with simple exogenous borrowing constraints in bond holdings.
Because the particular rental markets model may be a choice if one abstracts from
trade frictions in durable goods, it is of interest to compare the SIM model with the
IMD model in addition to the IMDR model.
The environment of the rental markets model is the same as the one described in
Section 3.1, except for the presence of a nancial intermediary. Rental markets for
durable goods are now introduced. It is assumed that households do not own durable
goods but only rent them and the nancial intermediary accumulates durable goods
and rents them out to households. In addition to trading durable goods, the nancial







Let z denote the amount of risk-free bonds that households hold. Let s = (y;z)
denote the state of a household. Households have a stochastic endowment process as
before. With their endowments, they purchase nondurable goods, rent durable goods,
and trade risk-free bonds. Given the risk-free interest rate r and the rental price of
durable goods 
, which is equal to (r + )=(1 + r) as described above, households
solve the following problem:

















d   a; (11)
c  0; (12)




















Constraint (10) is the budget constraint and constraint (11) is the borrowing con-
straint, which makes this model equivalent to the IMDR model as will become clear
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Given a risk-free interest rate r, optimal policies c and d for the
household problem in the IMDR model coincide with those in the model with rental
markets.16
Proof. Note that without irreversibility constraints, households do not need to know
the composition of their wealth. That is, c(y;a;k) = c(y;~ a;~ k) and d(y;a;k) =
d(y;~ a;~ k) if (1+r)a+k = (1+r)~ a+~ k. Thus, one can write c(y;a;k) = c(y;(1+r)a+k)
and d(y;a;k) = d(y;(1 + r)a + k).
Substituting (6) into (2) yields:
c + d + a












0 = y + (1 + r)a + k;
Now dene z0 = a0 + ((1   )=(1 + r))d = a0 + (1=(1 + r))k0. Of course, z =







0 = y + (1 + r)z:
16This proposition immediately implies that the stationary equilibrium of the IMDR model, de-
ned in a standard way, and that of the corresponding rental-market model share the same optimal
policies c and d and the same equilibrium interest rate r.
25Because 
 = (r+)=(1+r) in the model with rental markets, this is exactly the same
as (10). The denition of z0 and (3) in the IMDR model imply (11) in the model with
rental markets. Then the household problems in these two models share the same
constraint set. Because household preferences are the same in both models, it implies
that, under the same interest rate r, optimal policies c and d are the same. 
Corollary 1 Replace constraint (11) with z0   a. Then the household problem in
the model with rental markets corresponds to that in the SIM model.
Proposition 1 shows that the IMDR model itself is not represented by a rental mar-
kets model with simple borrowing constraints. To establish the correspondence, the
rental-markets model needs to have constraint (11), which requires a `down payment'
for consumption services of durable goods. On the other hand, if the rental-markets
model has simple borrowing constraints, then the corresponding model, which is the
SIM model, must have collateralized borrowing constraints.
26Table 10: Sample Selection
Observations Remaining
deleted observations
Original data set (1980{2001) 167919
Aged less than 21 or more than 64 74511 93408
Incomplete income respondents 20621 72787
Zero food expenditure 256 72531
Only food expenditure 41 72490
Missing interviews 25745 46745
Inconsistent characteristics 3027 43718
Missing main characteristics 3752 39966
Change in marital status 464 39502
Non-positive, missing annual income 732 38770
Non-positive, missing labor earnings 3136 35634
Non-positive weeks worked 53 35131
Head's wage less than half min wage 2763 32368
Negative medical care expenditures 2299 30069
Main characteristics include region of residence and head's and spouse's (if present)
sex, race, education, and occupation.
27Table 11: Expected Service Life and Expenditure Share
Expected life Expenditure
(in years) share
Men's hosiery 1.7 0.0022
Men's suits and coats 4.1 0.0243
Men's shirts and nightwear 2.7 0.0168
Men's underwear 2.2 0.0032
Men's pants 2.7 0.0221
Men's other apparel 2.68 0.0078
Boys' hosiery 1.7 0.0008
Boys' suits and coats 4.1 0.0042
Boys' shirts and nightwear 2.7 0.0055
Boys' underwear 2.2 0.0013
Boys' pants 2.7 0.0094
Boys' other apparel 2.68 0.0025
Women's hosiery 1 0.0086
Women's shirts and blouses 2.3 0.0167
Women's dresses and suits 4 0.0257
Women's coats 4.3 0.0210
Women's underwear 1.8 0.0108
Women's pants 2.7 0.0324
Women's other apparel 3.02 0.0112
Girls' hosiery 1 0.0010
Girls' shirts and blouses 2.3 0.0063
Girls' dresses and suits 4 0.0039
Girls' coats 4.3 0.0023
Girls' underwear 1.8 0.0022
Girls' other apparel 2.68 0.0032




Apparel related products 10 0.0035
Carpet and rugs 11.1 0.0120




Mattresses and springs 15 0.0162






lawn mowers 7.5 0.0084
Stoves and ovens 14.1 0.0027
Refrigerators and freezers 15 0.0020
Washers and dryers 11 0.0013
Portable heaters 11.3 0.0028





Other household appliances 10 0.0086
TV and sound equipment 11.9 0.0051
Musical instruments 13 0.0035
CD and tapes 5 0.0027
Sporting goods and equipment 10 0.0013
Games and toys 5 0.0042
Film and photographic equipment 6.7 0.0204
Maintenance and repairs (vehicles) 3 0.0173
Eyeglasses and contacts 10 0.1664
Other medical equipments 6 0.0140
Books 11 0.0018
Educational books 11 0.0156
Notes: Expected life of men's and women's other apparel is the average of that
of hosiery, suits, shirts, underwear, and pants. Expected life of boys' and girls'
apparel is set to that of men's and women's apparel, respectively. Expected life of
women's pants is set to that of men's pants. Expected life of infants' apparel is the
average of that of hosiery and underwear. Expected life of apparel related product
is set to that of other household appliances. (Source: Table 2 of Bils and Klenow
(1998) and the CEX.)
29References
Attanasio, O. and S. J. Davis (1996). Relative wage movements and the distribution
of consumption. Journal of Political Economy 104, 1227{62.
Bils, M. and P. J. Klenow (1998). Using consumer theory to test competing business
cycle models. Journal of Political Economy 106, 233{261.
Blundell, R., L. Pistaferri, and I. Preston (2008). Consumption inequality and partial
insurance. American Economic Review 98(5), 1887{1921.
Bound, J., C. Brown, G. Duncan, and W. Rodgers (1994). Evidence on the validity of
cross-sectional and longitudinal labor market data. Journal of Labor Economics 12,
345{368.
Bound, J. and A. Krueger (1994). The extent of measurement error in longitudinal
earnings data: Do two wrongs make a right? Journal of Labor Economics 9, 1{24.
Browning, M. and T. F. Crossley (2004). Shocks, stocks and socks: smoothing con-
sumption over a temporary income loss. Mimeo.
D az-Gim enez, J., V. Quadrini, and J.-V. R os-Rull (1997). Dimensions of inequality:
Facts on the U.S. distributions of earnings, income, and wealth. Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 21(2), 3{27.
Dynarski, S. and J. Gruber (1997). Can families smooth variable earnings? Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity 8(1), 229{303.
Fern andez-Villaverde, J. and D. Krueger (2002). Consumption and saving over life
cycle: How important are consumer durables? Proceedings of the 2002 North
American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society: Macroeconomic Theory.
Gervais, M. and P. Klein (2006). Measuirng consumption smoothing in CEX data.
Mimeo.
Hayashi, F., J. Altonji, and L. Kotliko (1996). Risk-sharing between and within
families. Econometrica 64, 261{294.
Heathcote, J., K. Storesletten, and G. L. Violante (2008). The macroeconomic im-
plications of rising wage inequality in the united states. Working Paper 14052,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Huggett, M. (1993). The risk-free rate in heterogenous-agent, incomplete insurance
economies. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 17(5{6), 953{969.
30Krueger, D. and F. Perri (2006). Does income inequality lead to consumption in-
equality? Evidence and theory. Review of Economic Studies 73, 163{193.
Luengo-Prado, M. J. (2006). Durables, nondurables, down payments and consump-
tion excesses. Journal of Monetary Economics 53(7), 1509{1539.
McGrattan, E. and E. C. Prescott (2003). Average debt and equity returns: Puzzling?
American Economic Review 93, 392{397.
Meghir, C. and L. Pistaferri (2004). Income variance dynamics and heterogeneity.
Econometrica 72(1).
Nelson, J. A. (1994). On testing for full insurance using Consumer Expenditure
Survey data. Journal of Political Economy 102(2), 384{394.
Storesletten, K., C. I. Telmer, and A. Yaron (2004a). Consumption and risk sharing
over the life cycle. Journal of Monetary Economics 51(3), 609{633.
Storesletten, K., C. I. Telmer, and A. Yaron (2004b). Cyclical dynamics in idiosyn-
cratic labor market risk. Journal of Political Economy 112(3), 695{717.
Tauchen, G. and R. Hussey (1991). Quadrature-based methods for obtaining approx-
imate solutions to nonlinear asset pricing models. Econometrica 59(2), 371{396.
31